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Summary
The potential of terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is
increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of
September 11, 2001.  Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the
deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear,
causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability.  Attacks against agriculture
are not new, and have been conducted or considered by both nation-states and
substate organizations throughout history.
The results of an agroterrorist attack may include major economic crises in the
agricultural and food industries, loss of confidence in government, and possibly
human casualties.  Humans could be at risk in terms of food safety or public health,
especially if the chosen disease is transmissible to humans (zoonotic).  Public opinion
may be particularly sensitive to a deliberate outbreak of disease affecting the food
supply.  Public confidence in government could be eroded if authorities appear
unable to prevent such an attack or to protect the population’s food supply.
Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems for managing
the threat.  Agricultural production is geographically disbursed in unsecured
environments.  Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations, and then
transported and commingled with other herds.  Pest and disease outbreaks can
quickly halt economically important exports.  Many veterinarians lack experience
with foreign animal diseases that are resilient and endemic in foreign countries.
Agriculture and food production generally have received less attention in
counter-terrorism and homeland security efforts.  But more recently, agriculture has
garnered more attention in the expanding field of terrorism studies.  Laboratory and
response systems are being upgraded to address the reality of agroterrorism.
Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and enacted laws and
appropriations with agroterrorism-related provisions.  The executive branch has
responded by implementing the new laws, issuing several presidential directives, and
creating liaison and coordination offices.  The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has studied several issues related to agroterrorism.  
Appropriations and user fees for USDA homeland security activities have about
doubled from a $156 million “pre-September 11” baseline in FY2002 to $325 million
in FY2004.  Two supplemental appropriations acts added nearly $110 million in both
FY2002 and FY2003.  For FY2005, the department is requesting $651 million in
appropriations and user fees.  On July 13, 2004, the House passed the FY2005
agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 4766), including several agroterrorism items.
In addition to appropriations activity for agroterrorism preparedness, two bills
addressing agroterrorism preparedness have been introduced in the 108th Congress,
S. 427 (the Agriculture Security Assistance Act) and S. 430 (the Agriculture Security
Preparedness Act).  This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness
Agriculture as a Target
Overview of the Threat
The potential of terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is
increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of
September 11, 2001.  In this context, agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate
introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing
economic losses, and/or undermining stability.
Agroterrorism is a subset of the more general issues of terrorism and
bioterrorism.  People more generally associate bioterrorism with outbreaks of human
illness (such as from anthrax or smallpox), rather than diseases first affecting animals
or plants.  Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems for
managing the threat:
! Agricultural production is geographically disbursed in unsecured
environments (e.g., open fields and pastures throughout the
countryside).  While some livestock are housed in secure facilities,
agriculture in general requires large expanses of land that are
difficult to secure from intruders.
! Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations (e.g.,
feedlots with thousands of cattle in open-air pens, farms with tens of
thousands of pigs, or barns with hundreds of thousands of poultry).
Concentration in slaughter, processing, and distribution also makes
large scale contamination more likely.
! Live animals, grain, and processed food products are routinely
transported and commingled in the production and processing
system.  These factors circumvent natural barriers that could slow
pathogenic dissemination.
! The presence (or rumor) of certain pests or diseases in a country can
quickly stop all exports of a commodity, and can take months or
years to resume.
! The past success of keeping many diseases out of the U.S. means
that many veterinarians and scientists lack direct experience with
foreign diseases.  This may delay recognition of symptoms in case
of an outbreak.
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! The number of lethal and contagious biological agents is greater for
plants and animals than for humans.  Most of these diseases are
environmentally resilient, endemic in foreign countries, and not
harmful to humans – making it easier for terrorists to acquire,
handle, and deploy the pathogens.
Thus, the general susceptibility of the agriculture and food industry to
bioterrorism is difficult to address in a systematic way due to the highly dispersed,
yet concentrated nature of the industry and the inherent biology of growing plants and
raising animals.
The results of an agroterrorist attack may include major economic crises in the
agricultural and food industries, loss of confidence in government, and possibly
human casualties.  Humans could be at risk in terms of food safety or public health,
especially if the chosen disease is transmissible to humans (zoonotic).  But an
agroterrorist attack need not cause human casualties for it to be effective or to cause
large scale economic consequences.
The production agriculture sector would suffer economically in terms of plant
and animal health, and the supply of food and fiber may be reduced, especially in
certain regions.  The demand for certain types of food may decline based on which
products are targeted in the attack (e.g., dairy, beef, pork, poultry, grains, fruit, or
vegetables), while demand for other types of food may rise due to food substitutions.
An agroterrorism event would cause economic losses to individuals, businesses,
and governments through costs to contain and eradicate the disease, and to dispose
of contaminated products.  Economic losses would accumulate throughout the farm-
to-table continuum as the supply chain is disrupted, especially if domestic markets
for food become unstable or if trade sanctions are imposed by other countries on U.S.
exports.  The economic impact can spread to farmers, input suppliers, food
processors, transportation, retailers, and food service providers.
Public opinion may be particularly sensitive to a deliberate outbreak of disease
affecting the food supply.  Public confidence in government could be eroded if
authorities appear unable to prevent such an attack or to protect the population’s food
supply.  As the United States evolved away from an agrarian society during the 20th
century, food and the fear of inadequate food supplies moved further from the minds
of most U.S. residents.  However, because food remains an important part of
everyone’s daily routine and survival, significant threats to the currently-held notion
of food security in the U.S. could cause a reordering of people’s priorities.
Because an agroterrorist attack may not necessarily cause human casualties, be
immediately detected, or have the “shock factor” of an attack against the more visible
public infrastructure or human populations, agriculture may not be a terrorist’s first
choice of targets.  Nonetheless, some types of agroterrorism could be relatively easily
achieved and have significant economic impacts.  Thus, the possibilities are treated
seriously, especially in the post-September 11 world.
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1  An example of concern over the misuse of agricultural inputs is the Department of
Transportation’s regulation (49 CFR Part 172, Subpart I) on securing dangerous agricultural
materials such as fuels, chemicals, and fertilizers against theft
[http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubtrain/AgSecPlan.pdf].
2   For more information on the security of the food distribution system, see CRS Report
RL31853, Food Safety Issues in the 108th Congress, by Donna Vogt.
3  USDA Economic Research Service, Agricultural Outlook tables, May 2004
[http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/Agoutlook/AOTables].
Figure 1. Geographic Concentration of Agricultural Production
This report addresses the use of biological weapons against agriculture, rather
than the threat of terrorists using agricultural inputs for other purposes.1  It also
focuses more on agricultural production than food processing and distribution.2
Importance of Agriculture in the U.S.
Agriculture and the food industry are very important to the social, economic,
and arguably, the political stability of the U.S.  Although farming employs less than
2% of the of the country’s workforce, 16% of the workforce is involved in the food
and fiber sector, ranging from farmers and input suppliers, to processors, shippers,
grocers, and restauranteurs.  In 2002, the food and fiber sector contributed $1.2
trillion, or 11% to the gross domestic product (GDP), even though the farm sector
itself contributed less than 1%.3  Gross farm sales exceeded $200 billion, and are
relatively concentrated throughout the Midwest, parts of the East Coast, and
California (Figure 1).  Production is split nearly evenly between crops and livestock.
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4  Parker, Henry S., Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat,
McNai r  Pape r  65 ,  Na t iona l  Defense  Un ive r s i t y ,  March  2002
[http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair65/McN_65.pdf].
5  U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003 – Agriculture
[http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-03.html].  
6  USDA Economic Research Service, Agricultural Outlook tables, May 2004.
7  USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2002 Census of Agriculture, June 2004
[http://www.nass.usda.gov/census].
Agriculture in the U.S. highly advanced and productive.  This productivity
allows Americans to spend less than 11% of their disposable income on food,
compared with a global average of 20-30%.4
Although the number of farms in the 2002 Census of Agriculture totaled 2.1
million, 75% of the value of production occurs on just 6.7%, or 143,500, of these
farms.  This subset of farms has average sales of $1 million annually, and averages
2,000 acres in size.
 The U.S. produces and exports a large share the world’s grain.  In 2002, the
U.S. exported $53 billion of agricultural products (8% of all U.S. exports), and
imported $42 billion of agricultural products (4% of all U.S. imports), making
agriculture a positive contributor to the balance of trade.  The U.S. share of world
production was 39% for corn, 38% for soybeans, and 8% for wheat.  The U.S.
accounted for 23% of global wheat exports, 54% of corn exports and 43% of soybean
exports.5  If export markets were to decline following an agroterrorism event, U.S.
markets could be severely disrupted since 22% of U.S. agricultural production is
exported (10% of livestock, and 23% of crops).
The price of land is directly correlated to the productivity and marketability of
agricultural products, along with federal farm income support payments.  In 2002,
farm assets exceeded $1.3 trillion, with $1.1 trillion in equity.  Land and other real
estate accounts for 80% of those assets.  Of the 938 million acres of farm land in the
U.S., 46% are in crop land, 42% are pasture and range land, and 8% are wood land.6
Livestock and poultry are concentrated in various regions of the country, and in
large numbers.  In 2002, the inventory included 95 million cattle and calves, 60
million hogs and pigs.  Farm sales of broilers and other meat-type chickens exceeded
8.5 billion birds.7
Cattle are the most widely distributed given the prevalence of small cow-calf
herds throughout the country and pockets of dairy on the West Coast, upper Midwest,
and Northeast.  However, beef cattle feedlots are particularly concentrated from
northern Texas through Kansas, Nebraska, eastern Colorado, and western Iowa. 
Hog inventories are concentrated in the Midwest, especially Iowa and southern
Minnesota, and in North Carolina.  The production of broilers for poultry meat is
concentrated throughout the Southeast, ranging from the Oklahoma-Arkansas border
up to the Delmarva peninsula (Delaware-Maryland-Virginia). 
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8  This report considers only “modern” instances of directing  weapons against agriculture
and food.  However, such attacks can be cited for centuries prior to 1900, usually on a much
smaller scale than generally conceived today.  Furthermore, this report focuses primarily on
biological weapons (rather than chemical weapons) because biological weapons generally
are considered the more potent threat for agroterrorist activity.
9  Sources: Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Agro-terrorism”
[http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/agromain.htm]; University of Minnesota Center for
Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP),“Overview of Agricultural Biosecurity,”
[http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/biosecurity/ag-biosec/biofacts/agbiooview.html]
and  Peter Chalk, RAND National Defense Research Institute, “Hitting America’ Soft
Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against U.S. Agricultural
and Food Industry,” 2004 [http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG135/MG135.pdf].
10  Examples of state actors using biological weapons against agriculture include Germany’s
use of glanders against Allied horses and mules in World War I, the alleged use of anthrax
and rinderpest by Japan in World War II, and the alleged use of glanders by Soviet forces
in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Source: Monterey Institute of International Studies; and Center
for Infectious Disease Research and Policy).
11  Source: Peter Chalk (2004), p. 29.
A Brief History of Agricultural Bioweapons
Attacks against agriculture are not new, and have been conducted both by
nation-states and by substate organizations throughout history.8  At least nine
countries had documented agricultural bioweapons programs during some part of the
20th century (Canada, France, Germany, Iraq, Japan, South Africa, United Kingdom,
United States, and the former USSR).  Four other countries are believed to have or
have had agricultural bioweapons programs (Egypt, North Korea, Rhodesia, and
Syria).9
Despite extensive research on the issue, however, biological weapons have been
used rarely against crops or livestock, especially by state actors.10  Thus, in recent
decades, using biological weapons against agricultural targets has remained mostly
a theoretical consideration.  With the ratification of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention in 1972, many countries, including the United States, stopped
military development of biological weapons and destroyed their stockpiles.
Although individuals or substate groups have used bioweapons against
agricultural or food targets, only a few can be considered terrorist in nature.  In 1952,
the Mau Mau (an insurgent organization in Kenya) killed 33 head of cattle at a
mission station using African milk bush (a local plant toxin).  In 1984, the
Rajneeshee cult spread salmonella in salad bars at Oregon restaurants to influence a
local election.11
Chemical weapons have been used somewhat more commonly against
agricultural targets. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. used agent orange to destroy
foliage, affecting some crops.  Among possible terrorist events, chemical attacks
against agricultural targets include a 1997 attack by Israeli settlers who sprayed
pesticides on grapevines in two Palestinian villages, destroying up to 17,000 metric
CRS-6
12  Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP).
13  CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade, by Charles Hanrahan and
Geoffrey Becker.
tons of grapes.  In 1978, the Arab Revolutionary Council poisoned Israeli oranges
with mercury, injuring at least 12 people and reducing orange exports by 40%.12
Economic Consequences
Economic losses from an agroterrorist incident could be large and widespread.
! First, the losses would include the value of lost production, the cost
of destroying diseased or potentially diseased products, and the cost
of containment (vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, pesticides, and
veterinary services). 
! Second, export markets would be lost as importing countries place
restrictions on U.S. products to prevent possibilities of the disease
spreading.
! Third, multiplier effects would ripple through the economy due to
decreased sales by agriculturally dependent businesses (farm input
suppliers, food manufacturing, transportation, retail grocery, and
food service) and tourism. 
! Fourth, the government could bear significant costs, including
eradication and containment costs, and compensation to producers
for destroyed animals.
Depending on the erosion of consumer confidence and export sales, market
prices of the affected commodities may drop.  This would affect producers whose
herds or crops were not directly infected, making the event national in scale even if
the disease itself were contained to a small region.
On the other hand, demand for food products that are not contaminated may
become stronger, and market prices could rise for those products.  Such goods may
include substitutes for the food that was the target of the attack (e.g., chicken instead
of beef), or product that can be certified not to come from regions affected by the
attack (e.g., beef from another region of the country, or imported beef).  When
Canada announced the discovery of mad cow disease (BSE, or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy) in May 2003, farm-level prices of beef in Canada dropped by nearly
half, while beef prices in the United States remained very strong at record or near
record levels.  When a cow with BSE was discovered in the United States in
December 2003, U.S. beef prices fell, but less dramatically than in Canada.13
Consumer confidence in government may also be tested depending on the scale
of the eradication effort and means of destroying animals or crops.  The need to
slaughter perhaps hundreds of thousands of cattle (or tens of millions of poultry)
could generate public criticism if depopulation methods are considered inhumane or
CRS-7
14  Renlemann and Spinelli, “An Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of African
Swine Fever Prevention,” Animal Health Insight, Spring/Summer 1994.
15  Parker, Henry S. (2002).
16  Mathews, Kenneth H., and Janet Perry, “The Economic Consequences of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy and Food and Mouth Disease Outbreaks in the United States,”
Appendix 6 in Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention and Control Act of 2001 (P.L.
107-9): Final Report of the P.L. 107-9 Federal Inter-Agency Working Group.  January 2003
[http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pubs/PL107-9_1-03.pdf].
17  Lautner, Beth, and Steve Meyer, “U.S. Agriculture in Context: Sector’s Importance to the
American Economy and Its Role in Global Trade,” Conference Proceedings of The [White
House] Office of Science and Technology Policy Blue Ribbon Panel on The Threat of
Biological Terrorism Directed Against Livestock, Washington, DC, December 8-9, 2003
[http://www.rand.org/scitech/stpi/Bioagpanel].
the destruction of carcases is questioned environmentally.  Dealing with these
concerns can add to the cost for both government and industry.
Depending on the disease and means of transmission, the potential for economic
damage depends on a number of factors such as the disease agent, location of the
attack, rate of transmission, geographical dispersion, how long it remains undetected,
availability of countermeasures or quarantines, and incident response plans.  Potential
costs are difficult to estimate and can vary widely based on compounding
assumptions.
A 1994 study by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) on
African swine fever suggested that if the disease were to become entrenched in the
U.S., the 10-year impact would be at least $5.4 billion.14  The impact in today’s
dollars could be much higher.  A National Defense University study estimates that
a limited outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) on just 10 farms could have a
$2 billion financial impact.15  A study by the USDA Economic Research Service
(ERS) outlines the wide-ranging implications of a FMD outbreak in the U.S.,
assigning probabilities for animal losses but not estimating a dollar loss.16 
Drawing on the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001, Price
Waterhouse Coopers estimated that the economic impact was $1,389 to $4,477 for
each of the 2.6 million head of livestock (cattle, sheep, and hogs) on which
indemnities were paid in the U.K.  These impacts exceed the value of the animals
because of the number of industries affected by the outbreak, ranging from feed
suppliers to tourism.  Applying the loss ratios from the U.K. incident to the larger
U.S. livestock industry, Price Waterhouse Coopers estimates that 7.5 million animals
(5.3 million cattle, 1.4 million hogs, and 800,000 sheep) might be destroyed in a
similar outbreak in the U.S.  The resulting economic impact could range from $10.4
billion to $33.6 billion, using the range of impacts estimated from the U.K.17
CRS-8
18  Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Commission).  First Annual
Report to the President and Congress: Assessing the Threat.  December 15, 1999, p. 12-15
[http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel].
19  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
Report, July 2004 [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf].
20  Statements from the November 19, 2003, hearing are available online at
[http://govt-aff.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=127].
Federal Recognition of Agroterrorism Threats
References to agroterrorism and/or agricultural bioweapons clearly exist in the
government, academia, and the press prior to 2000.  For example, the Gilmore
Commission, in its first report to Congress in 1999, noted that
“... a biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually
risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success and which also
has the prospect of obtaining political objectives, such as undermining
confidence in the ability of government or giving the terrorists an improved
bargaining position.”18
However, agriculture and food production generally have received relatively less
attention, or sometimes were overlooked, in counter-terrorism and homeland
security.  After what many observers claim to be a slow start after September 11,
2001, agriculture now is garnering more attention in the expanding field of terrorism
studies and policies.
Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and, while addressing terrorism
more broadly, has implemented laws and appropriations with provisions important
to agriculture.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has studied various
aspects of food safety, border inspections, and physical security with respect to
agroterrorism.  The executive branch has responded by implementing the new laws,
issuing several presidential directives, and creating terrorism and agroterrorism task
forces.
In its report, the 9/11 Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States) does not make any direct references to agroterrorism or
terrorism on the food supply.19  However, agriculture obviously would be affected,
along with other sectors of the economy, by some of the commission’s
recommendations regarding coordination of intelligence, information sharing, and
first responders.  An evaluation of those separate issues, however, is outside the
scope of this report.
Congressional Hearings and Laws
On November 19, 2003, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held
a hearing titled, “Agroterrorism: The Threat to America's Breadbasket,” including
witnesses from the Administration, state governments, and a private think tank.20
This was the first congressional hearing devoted entirely to agroterrorism since
CRS-9
21  Statements from the October 27, 1999, hearing are available online at
[http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/1999/e991027.htm].
22  For example, testimony by Peter Chalk, RAND, “Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection,
and the U.S. Food and Agriculture Sector” at the Senate Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of
Columbia hearing on “Federal Food Safety and Security,” October 10, 2001
[http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT184/CT184.pdf].
23  For greater detail about these rules, please see CRS Report RL31853, Food Safety Issues
in the 108th Congress, by Donna Vogt.
October 27, 1999.  At that time, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing titled, “Agricultural Biological
Weapons Threat to the United States.”21  During the 4 years between these hearings,
a few individual panelists at more general hearings on food safety, homeland
security, or terrorism discussed agroterrorism in reference to other topics.22
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act.  The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (P.L.107-188, June 12, 2002) contained
several provisions important to agriculture.  These provisions accomplish the
following:
! Expand Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority over food
manufacturing and imports (particularly in sections 303-307).
! Tighten control of biological agents and toxins (“select agents” as
discussed in sections 211-213, the “Agricultural Bioterrorism
Protection Act of 2002”) through rules issued by the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.
! Authorize expanded agricultural security activities and security
upgrades at USDA facilities (sections 331-335).
! Address criminal penalties for terrorism against enterprises raising
animals (section 336) and violation of the select agent rules (section
231).
New FDA Rules on Food Processors and Importers.  The Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act responded to long-standing concerns about whether the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
had the authority to assure food safety.  FDA was instructed to implement new rules
for (1) registration of food processors, (2) prior notice of food imports, (3)
administrative detention of imports, and (4) record-keeping.23
Proposed rules were issued in the spring 2003 followed by a comment period.
On October 10, 2003, FDA published two interim final rules for registration of food
facilities and prior notice of imports.  Those rules were implemented on December
12, 2003, but FDA allowed flexible enforcement during a transition period.   The rule
on administrative detention of imports was effective upon enactment, with FDA
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procedures announced on May 27, 2004.  The final rule for record keeping is
forthcoming.24
Registration of Food Processors.  The Act required FDA to establish a
one-time registration system for any domestic or foreign facility that manufactures,
processes, packs, and handles food.  All food facilities supplying food for the United
States were required to register with the FDA by December 12, 2003.  Registering
involved providing information about the food products (brand names and general
food categories), facility addresses, and contact information.  Restaurants, certain
retail stores, farms, non-profit food and feeding establishments, fishing vessels, and
trucks and other motor carriers were exempt from registration requirements.
However, many farms had a difficult time determining whether they needed to
register based on the amount of handling or processing they performed.
Registration documents are protected from public disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA).  The registry provides, for the first time, a complete list
of companies subject to FDA authority, and will enhance the agency's capability to
trace contaminated food. Critics argued that registration created a record keeping
burden without proof that facilities will be able to respond in an emergency.
Prior Notice of Imports.  As of December 12, 2003, importers are required to
give advance notice to FDA prior to importing food.  Electronic notice must be
provided by the importer within a specified period prior to arrival at the border
(within two hours by road, four hours by air or rail, and eight hours by water).  With
prior notice, FDA can assess whether a shipment meets criteria that can trigger an
inspection.  If notice is not given, the food will be refused entry and held at the port
or in secure storage.  Some critics are concerned that the administrative cost of
compliance may raise the price of food.  Others have argued that perishable imports
are subject to increased spoilage if delays arise, or that certain perishables (especially
from Mexico) are not harvested or loaded onto trucks before the two-hour
notification period.  However, implementation of the new system generally has not
caused delays and most shippers have been accommodated.
To facilitate compliance, FDA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) integrated their information systems
to allow food importers to provide the required information using CBP’s existing
system for imports.  In December 2003, the two agencies agreed to allow CBP
officers to inspect imported foods on FDA's behalf, particularly at ports where FDA
has no inspectors.
Administrative Detention.  Upon enactment of the Act, FDA obtained the
authority to detain food imports under certain conditions.  FDA procedures for
making detention were issued on June 4, 2004.  To use the authority, the agency must
show credible evidence that a shipment presents a serious health threat.  Food may
be detained for 20 days and up to 30 days, if necessary.  The owners must pay the
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expense of moving any detained food to secure storage.  Perishable foods (e.g., fruits,
vegetables, and seafood) are to receive expedited review.
Maintenance of Records.  FDA published a proposed rule for record-keeping
on May 9, 2003, and is still reviewing public comments.  In the event of a suspected
food safety problem, FDA would have access to records including the facility’s
immediate supplier, and the immediate customer.  Companies could keep the
information in any form and use existing records.
The rule would limit access to records that may contain trade secrets and prevent
disclosure of such confidential information if records are reviewed.  FDA is allowed
to reduce the record-keeping requirements for small businesses and to exempt farms,
restaurants, and fishing vessels not engaged in processing.
Security for Biological Agents and Toxins.  In December 2002, the
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) issued regulations to
reduce the threat that certain biological agents and toxins could be used in domestic
or international terrorism. APHIS determined that the “select agents” on the list have
the potential to pose a severe threat to agricultural production or food products.
The select agent regulations (9 CFR 121 for animals, 7 CFR 331 for plants)
establish the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of the listed pathogens.
The rules affect many research institutions including federal, state, university, and
private laboratories, as well as firms that transport such materials.  The laboratories
have had to assess security vulnerabilities and upgrade physical security, often
without additional financial resources.  Some have been concerned that certain
research programs may be discontinued or avoided because of regulatory difficulties
in handling the select agents.
Extensive registration and background checks of both facilities and personnel
were to be conducted in 2003.  However, due to delays at the FBI in processing
security clearance paperwork, provisional registrations were issued to laboratories
that had submitted paperwork by established deadlines.
Homeland Security Act.  The main purpose of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, November 25, 2002) was to create the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), primarily by transferring parts or all of many agencies
throughout the federal government into the new cabinet-level department.  In doing
so, the law made two major changes to the facilities and functions of the Department
of Agriculture.  The Homeland Security Act transferred:
! Agricultural border inspections from APHIS to DHS, and
! Possession of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York
from USDA to DHS.
Agricultural Border Inspections. Section 421 of the Homeland Security
Act authorized the transfer of up to 3,200 APHIS border inspection personnel to
DHS.  As of March 1, 2003, approximately 2,680 APHIS inspectors became
employees of DHS in the Bureau of Customs and Border Inspection (CBP).  Because
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of its scientific expertise, USDA retains a significant presence in border inspection,
as described below. 
Historically, the APHIS Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program was
considered the most significant and prominent of agricultural and food inspections
at the border.  Because of this prominence, AQI was one of the many programs
selected for inclusion when DHS was created.  Some drafts of the bill creating the
new department would have transferred all of APHIS (including, for example, animal
welfare and disease eradication) to DHS.  Concerns from many farm interest groups
about the impact this might have on diagnosis and treatment of natural plant and
animal diseases prompted a legislative compromise that transferred only the border
inspection function and left other activities under USDA.
DHS-CBP personnel now inspect international conveyances and the baggage of
passengers for plant, animal, and related products that could harbor pests or disease
organisms.  They also inspect ship and air cargo, rail and truck freight, and package
mail from foreign countries.
Although the border inspection functions were transferred to DHS, the USDA
retains a significant presence in border activities.  APHIS employees who were not
transferred continue to pre-clear certain commodities, inspect all plant propagative
materials, and check animals in quarantine.  APHIS personnel continue to set
agricultural inspection policies to be carried out by DHS border inspectors, and
negotiate memoranda of understanding to assure that necessary inspections are
conducted.  APHIS manages the data collected during the inspections process, and
monitors smuggling and trade compliance.  USDA is also statutorily charged in
section 421 (e)(2)(A) of the Act to “supervise” the training of CBP inspectors in
consultation with DHS.
This separation of duties is designed to allow for consolidated border
inspections for  intelligence and security goals, but preserve USDA’s expertise and
historical mission to set agricultural import policies.
Adding Agricultural Specialists.  Under the CBP cross-training initiative in
2003 (also known as “one face at the border”), most CBP inspectors are trained to
perform inspections in all three areas of customs, immigration, and agriculture.
However, due to criticism from USDA, inspection unions, and the agricultural
industry, DHS created another class of inspectors called agricultural specialists.
Agricultural specialists will staff, primarily, secondary inspection stations.  These
specialists will include former APHIS inspectors who decided not to convert to CBP
generalist inspectors and new agricultural specialist trainees.
Before DHS was created, APHIS trained its inspectors in a 9-week course that
had science prerequisites.  The initial DHS cross-training program announced in
2003 had only 12-16 hours for agriculture in a 71-day course covering customs,
immigration, and agriculture.  With the creation of the agricultural specialist position,
DHS created a 43-day training program for agricultural specialists.  The course is
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26  Chicago Sun Times. “Short-staffed Port Inspectors Missing Insect-infested Food,” August
6, 2004, [http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-port06.html].
27  GAO, Bioterrorism: A Threat to Agriculture and the Food Supply, GAO-04-259T,
November 19, 2003.
taught by CBP and APHIS instructors at a USDA training facility in Frederick,
Maryland.  The first class graduated on July 13, 2004.25
Although DHS is training new agricultural specialists, the future size of the
agricultural specialist corps is not certain, given the eventual attrition of former
APHIS inspectors.  Also, details are not available as to how these inspectors will be
deployed and how many ports of entry will be staffed with agricultural specialists
(compared with the APHIS deployment prior to DHS).  Without agricultural
specialists, primary agricultural inspections – the first line of defense for agricultural
security – may be conducted by cross-trained inspectors with limited agricultural
training.
Congressional agriculture committees have been concerned about whether
enough attention will be devoted  to agricultural inspections by DHS, and whether
the U.S. will be as safe from the introduction of foreign pests as it was under the
previous inspection system.  Inspection statistics from the fall of 2003 indicate that
32% fewer insect infestations were found (under DHS) than in the previous year
(under APHIS).  APHIS officials cite unfilled agricultural inspector positions and
difficulty in adequately cross training former customs and immigration officers to
conduct agricultural inspections.26
For more information about inspection statistics and the new border inspection
arrangement that combines the previously separate customs, immigration, and
agriculture inspections,  please see CRS Report RL32399, Border Security:
Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues. 
Plum Island Animal Disease Center.  Section 310 of the Homeland
Security Act transferred the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to DHS.  Prior to
June 1, 2003, Plum Island was a USDA facility jointly operated by APHIS and ARS
(Agricultural Research Service).  This transfer includes only the property and
facilities of Plum Island; both APHIS and ARS personnel continue to perform
research and diagnostic work at the facility, but DHS also may conduct other research
at the facility as well.
GAO Studies.  Since 2002, four reports from the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) have found gaps in federal controls for protecting agriculture and the
food supply.  These findings are summarized in testimony prepared for the Senate
hearing on agroterrorism on November 19, 2003.27
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In the first report, following the European outbreak of foot and mouth disease
in 2001, GAO found insufficient guidance for border inspectors and an
overwhelming volume of passengers and cargo for inspectors to process.28
Regarding prevention of BSE (“mad cow disease”), GAO found shortcomings
in documentation for imports and enforcement of federal feed ingredient bans.29
A GAO study on security improvements at food processing companies found
that federal agencies, particularly the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), did not
have authority to impose requirements or assess security flaws.30
Finally, regarding livestock disease research at USDA’s Plum Island lab in New
York, GAO found that people without adequate background checks had access to
secure areas, and that security personnel on the island had limited authority.31  In
response to GAO’s security concerns about Plum Island, DHS announced that armed
Federal Protective Service personnel would supplement security on the island
beginning in June 2004.
Executive Branch Actions
Shortly after September 11, 2001, USDA created a Homeland Security Staff in
the Office of the Secretary to develop a department-wide plan to coordinate
agroterrorism preparedness plans among all USDA agencies and offices.  Efforts
have been focused on three areas: food supply and agricultural production, USDA
facilities, and USDA staff and emergency preparedness.32  The Homeland Security
Staff also has become the department’s liaison with Congress, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and other governmental agencies on terrorism issues.
The White House’s National Security Council weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) preparedness group, formed by Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62)
in 1998, included agriculture, especially in terms of combating terrorism.  Many
observers note that, as a latecomer to the national security table, USDA has been
invariably overshadowed by other agencies.
HSPD-7 (Protecting Critical Infrastructure).  In terms of protecting
critical infrastructure, agriculture was added to the list in December 2003 by
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), “Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.”33  This directive replaces the 1998
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) that omitted agriculture and food.  Both
of these critical infrastructure directives designate the physical systems that are
vulnerable to terrorist attack and are essential for the minimal operation of the
economy and the government.
These directives instruct agencies to develop plans to prepare for and counter
the terrorist threat.  HSPD-7 mentions the following industries: agriculture and food;
banking and finance; transportation (air, sea, and land, including mass transit, rail,
and pipelines); energy (electricity, oil, and gas); telecommunications; public health;
emergency services; drinking water; and water treatment.
HSPD-9 (Defending Agriculture and Food).  More significant recognition
came on January 30, 2004, when the White House released Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), “Defense of United States Agriculture and
Food.”34   This directive establishes a national policy to protect against terrorist
attacks on agriculture and food systems.
HSPD-9 generally instructs the Secretaries of Homeland Security (DHS),
Agriculture (USDA), and Health and Human Services (HHS), the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Attorney General, and the Director
of Central Intelligence to coordinate their efforts to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, and recover from an agroterrorist attack.  In some cases, one department
is assigned primary responsibility, particularly when the intelligence community is
involved.  In other cases, only USDA, HHS, and/or EPA are involved regarding
industry or scientific expertise.
The directive instructs agencies to develop awareness and warning systems to
monitor plant and animal diseases, food quality, and public health through an
integrated diagnostic system. Animal and commodity tracking systems are included,
as is gathering and analyzing international intelligence.  Vulnerability assessments
throughout the sector help prioritize mitigation strategies at critical stages of
production or processing, including inspection of imported agricultural products.
Response and recovery plans are to be coordinated across the federal, state, and
local levels.  A National Veterinary Stockpiles (NVS) of vaccine, antiviral, and
therapeutic products is to be developed for deployment within 24 hours of an attack.
A National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) is to develop disease and pest
resistant varieties within one growing season of an attack in order to resume
production of certain crops.  The Secretary of Agriculture is to make
recommendations for risk management tools to encourage self-protection for
agriculture and food enterprises vulnerable to losses from terrorism.
HSPD-9 encourages USDA and HHS to promote higher education programs
that specifically address the protection of animal, plant, and public health.  It suggests
CRS-16
35  For a related discussion on the role of Congress with respect to executive actions, see
CRS Report RS20846, Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation.  An example of
agroterrorism legislation introduced in the 108th Congress is S. 427 and S. 430. 
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capacity-building grants for universities, and internships, fellowships and post-
graduate opportunities.  HSPD-9 also formally incorporates USDA and agriculture
into the ongoing DHS research program of university-based “centers of excellence.”
As a presidential directive, HSPD-9 addresses the internal management of the
executive branch and does not create enforceable laws.  Moreover, it is subject to
change without Congressional consent.  While Congress has oversight authority of
federal agencies and may ask questions about implementation of the directive, a
public law outlining an agroterrorism preparedness plan would establish the statutory
parameters for such a plan, and, as a practical matter, might result in enhanced
oversight by specifically identifying executive branch entities responsible for carrying
out particular components of such a plan.35
In implementing HSPD-9, the USDA Homeland Security Staff and other
agencies are drawing upon HSPD-5 (regarding the national response plan) and
HSPD-8 (regarding preparedness).  Implementing many of the HSPD-9 directives
depends on the executive branch having sufficient appropriations for those activities.
Federal Appropriations
The President’s annual budget request to Congress now includes a cross-cutting
budget analysis of homeland security issues, as mandated by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P.L.107-296, section 889).36  In USDA, six agencies and three offices
receive (or have requested) funding related to homeland security:
! Agricultural Research Service (ARS)
! Animal and Plant Health Inspection (APHIS)
! Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service
(CSREES)
! Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
! Economic Research Service (ERS)
! Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)
! Departmental Administration (including Office of the Secretary,
Homeland Security Staff (HSS), and Office of Chief Information
Officer (OCIO)).
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Classifying spending on agroterrorism and homeland security requires
judgements about which programs are relevant, especially when some have dual
purposes.37  For example, animal and plant health programs would be needed at some
level due to natural and accidental outbreaks, regardless of the need for agroterrorism
preparedness.  Such capacities are being due to agroterrorism.  For budgets, all or
part of such dual-use activities may be counted as homeland security spending,
especially when those functions are expanded due to agroterrorism concerns.
Amounts presented in this section, both before and after the creation of DHS,
are adjusted to reflect the transfer of the most of the border inspection function from
APHIS to DHS.  Thus, for comparability to the most recent year, only activities that
remain in USDA are included in the tables and figures, regardless of the time period.
By Year and Source.  Prior to September 11, 2001, USDA spent about $60
million (FY2002) in regular annual appropriations to combat terrorism, primarily
through border inspections and research.38   Since then, two supplemental and two
regular appropriations acts have provided significant additional funds.  The FY2005
budget request and House-passed appropriations bill also would increase funding.
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Figure 2. USDA Homeland Security Funding, by Year and
Source
Compared to FY2002, the FY2003 regular annual appropriation allocated to
USDA homeland security tripled to $180 million, and remained nearly steady at $190
million into FY2004 (Figure 2).
Two supplemental appropriations (P.L. 107-117 and P.L. 108-11) added nearly
$110 million annually in FY2002 and FY2003.  User fees for border security
contributed between $97 million to $133 million annually from FY2002 to FY2004.
Thus, counting regular appropriations and user fees, USDA homeland security
activities have about doubled from a $156 million “pre-September 11” baseline in
FY2002 to $325 million in FY2004. 
Adding the two supplemental acts to regular appropriations and user fees,
USDA homeland security funds total $264 million in FY2002, $410 million in
FY2003, $325 million in FY2004 (Figure 2).
For FY2005, the department is requesting $651 million ($511 million in
appropriations and $140 million in user fees).  The FY2005 budget request, and
particularly USDA’s Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative, is discussed in more
detail in the Issues section later in this report.
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In addition to these USDA activities, DHS is conducting the agricultural
inspections at the border formerly conducted by USDA,39 and supporting scientific
research at universities.  These activities are funded both from DHS appropriations
and user fees collected by USDA and transferred to DHS.  In FY2003, APHIS
transferred $69 million of border inspections user fees to DHS, not included in the
tables and figures for USDA.  In FY2004, APHIS expects to transfer user fees
totaling $194 million, and $204 million in FY2005.40
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Table 1.  USDA Homeland Security Funding, by Agency
Budget authority ($ million)
USDA
Agency


















appropriation 19.6 51.7 77.5 89.2 151.9
user fees 96.5 119.0 133.0 140.0
ARS 28.0 10.5 44.6 110.0 31.2 227.0
Dept admin 12.0 43.5 18.5 19.3 28.5
CSREES 31.6 38.7 65.8
FSIS 2.6 8.7 12.9 36.5
ERS 1.0 1.0
AMS 0.3
Total 156.1 108.3 299.9 110.0 325.3 651.0
Total yearly 264.4 409.9 325.3 651.0
Total, only
appropriation 59.6 108.3 180.9 110.0 192.3 511.0
Total, yearly
appropriation 167.9 290.9 192.3 511.0
Source: Compiled by CRS from USDA Office of Budget and Policy Analysis spreadsheets,
and Budget of the United States Government for FY2005: Analytical Perspectives,
“Appendix: Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and Budget Account,”
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/ap_cd_rom/homeland.pdf].
1 Includes only the parts of APHIS that remain in USDA after the creation of DHS.  Prior
to the creation of DHS, USDA was appropriated about $30 million annually (not reflected
here) for the border inspection functions transferred to DHS.  User fees include only those
retained in USDA. In FY2003, APHIS transferred $69 million of user fees to DHS. In
FY2004, APHIS expects to transfer $194 million, and $204 million in FY2005.
By Agency.  Table 1 presents USDA homeland security funding by agency,
accounting for user fees and supplemental acts.  Appendix A contains more detailed
information on the programs funded within each agency.
APHIS and ARS have received the vast majority of USDA’s $651 million
combined FY2002-04 appropriation (excluding user fees) for homeland security.
APHIS and ARS have had similar homeland security appropriations ($238 million
and $224 million, respectively), but APHIS clearly has more homeland security
activity funding if the $349 million of user fees are added to its total for the three
years  (Figure 3).
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in Athens, Georgia, and an Army lab in Ft. Dietrick, Maryland.
Figure 3. USDA Homeland Security Funding, by Agency
Most of the APHIS activity in the homeland security area has been for border
inspections, predominantly funded through user fees rather than appropriations.
Most of ARS’s funding has gone for construction of a BSL-3 research and diagnostic
laboratory in Ames, Iowa, that ARS operates jointly with APHIS.41
By Function.  For the President’s budget request, agencies throughout the
federal government categorize their funding based on six mission areas (functions),
as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security:
! Intelligence and warning
! Border and transportation security
! Domestic counter-terrorism
! Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets
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! Defending against catastrophic threats
! Emergency preparedness and response
Table 2 presents the information by homeland security function. Over a multi-
year period, border inspections are the largest USDA homeland security activity even
after most of the inspectors were transferred to DHS.  As discussed in the section on
the Homeland Security Act, APHIS still inspects passengers and cargo between
Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the mainland, and consults on setting inspections policies.
Table 2.  USDA Homeland Security Funding, by Function
Budget authority, including user fees ($ million)
Homeland Security Mission Area FY2003 FY2004
FY2005
Request
Border and transportation security1 143.2 163.1 169.3
Defending against catastrophic threats 154.6 20.7 227.0
Protecting critical infrastructure, key assets 60.5 86.3 166.0
Emergency preparedness and response 50.8 54.4 68.7
Intelligence and warning 0.8 0.8 20.0
Total 409.9 325.3 651.0
Source: Compiled by CRS from USDA Office of Budget and Policy Analysis spreadsheets,
and Budget of the United States Government for FY2005: Analytical Perspectives,
“Appendix: Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and Budget Account,”
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/ap_cd_rom/homeland.pdf].
1 Includes user fees retained in USDA, but excludes unspecified DHS appropriations for
agricultural inspections and user fees collected by APHIS and transferred to DHS.  In
FY2003, APHIS transferred $69 million of user fees. In FY2004, APHIS expects to transfer
$194 million, and $204 million in FY2005.  Prior to the creation of DHS, USDA was
appropriated about $30 million annually for the border inspections transferred to DHS.
Defending against catastrophic threats is the next largest activity, primarily
because of the ARS laboratory construction in Ames, IA. Protecting critical
infrastructure has been another large activity, including both physical security
improvements throughout USDA and activities for protecting the country’s
agricultural productive capacity.  Such activities include research, diagnostic, and
testing programs, and establishing networks and partnerships with States,
universities, and other organizations.
Emergency preparedness and intelligence have received relatively less funding.
Primary intelligence gathering is viewed more appropriately as the responsibility of
other federal agencies such as the FBI and CIA.  These agencies track and act upon
bioterrorism information, but USDA needs to be informed also. USDA has limited
experience working in the intelligence community, thus building effective
partnerships remains a challenge.
Appendix A has more details on these programs by function and agency, and
is categorized by homeland security mission area.
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42  This supplemental appropriation precedes the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, and the transfer to DHS of the APHIS border inspection function and the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center.  Thus, for comparison with more recent figures, a significant
portion of the $328 million appropriation did not remain with USDA, as reflected in budget
figures provided by USDA for the FY2002 supplemental in Table 1.
Chronology of Appropriations Since September 11, 2001.  The
following list outlines appropriations acts that have provided funds for homeland
security in USDA since September 11, 2001.
! Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2001 (P.L. 107-38;
September 18, 2001).  Within days of September 11, Congress
approved $40 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations
partitioned over three time periods.  USDA received no money for
domestic homeland security programs in the first two installments,
but did receive an allocation in the final installment for FY2002 (see
FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Act below).
! FY2002 Agriculture Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-76; November
28, 2001).  Table 1 shows that $60 million went to USDA homeland
security activities.
! FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 107-117; January 10,
2002). Congress made the final $20 billion installment from the
FY2001 supplemental in Division B of the FY2002 Defense
Department Appropriation (“Transfers from the Emergency
Response Fund [ERF] Pursuant to P.L. 107-38”).  USDA received
$328 million for homeland security programs, but, after the creation
of DHS, retained functions receiving $108 million.42
! FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery
(P.L. 107-206; August 2, 2002).  In this $28 billion supplemental
appropriation, Congress included about $123 million for USDA
programs related to homeland security.  These amounts, however,
were designated among $5.1 billion of “contingent emergency
spending” that President Bush chose not to use, and thus the funds
were not available to USDA and other departments (see CRS Report
RL31406, Supplemental Appropriations for FY2002).
! FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7; February 20,
2003).  Table 1 show that $181 million went to homeland security
activities in USDA.
! FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act
(P.L. 108-11; April 16, 2003).  Congress appropriated $110 million
to the Agricultural Research Service “for continued modernization
of facilities in Ames, Iowa, which will provide a laboratory building,
fixed equipment, and associated infrastructure” (H.Rept. 108-076).
! FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-199; January
23, 2004).  Table 1 shows that $192 million went to homeland
security activities in USDA.  In this regular appropriations act,
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is a well-respected information clearinghouse for animal diseases and health.  Member
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scientific information on animal disease control, provides technical support, and develops
normative documents that are recognized by the World Trade Organization for international
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conferees made the following statement about USDA’s homeland
security activities:
“[A]s of September 30, 2003, $80,000,000 remains available to the Department
from funds provided through the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) [see
discussion of P.L. 107-38 and P.L. 107-117 above], of which nearly $9,000,000
is available to the Secretary.  Since these funds were provided, USDA has been
one of the slowest Federal agencies to obligate its ERF funds.  The conferees are
aware of concerns about security, [and] urge the Secretary to act promptly to
address identified security needs and to advise the Committees on Appropriations
of needs for which additional funds may be necessary” (H.Rept. 108-401).
! The FY2005 budget request, and particularly USDA’s Food and
Agriculture Defense Initiative, is discussed in more detail in the
Issues section later in this report.  The department is requesting $651
million in homeland security funds.
Possible Pathogens in an Agroterrorist Attack
Of the hundreds of animal and plant pathogens and pests available to an
agroterrorist, perhaps fewer than a couple of dozen represent significant economic
threats.  Determinants of this level of threat are the agent’s contagiousness and
potential for rapid spread, and its international status as a “reportable” pest or disease
(i.e., subject to international quarantine) under rules of the World Organization for
Animal Health (also commonly known as the OIE, the Office International des
Epizooties).43
A widely accepted view among scientists is that livestock herds are much more
susceptible to agroterrorism than crop plants.  Much of this has to do with the success
of efforts to systematically eliminate animals diseases from U.S. herds, which leaves
current herds either unvaccinated or relatively unmonitored for such diseases by
farmers and some local veterinarians.  Once infected, livestock can often act as the
vector for continuing to transmit the disease, facilitating an outbreak’s spread,
especially when live animals are transported.  Certain animal diseases may be more
attractive to terrorists because they can be zoonotic, or transmissible to humans.
In contrast, a number of plant pathogens continue to exist in small areas of the
U.S. and continue to infect limited areas of plants each year, making outbreaks and
control efforts more routine.  Moreover, plant pathogens are generally more
technically difficult to manipulate.  Some plant pathogens may require certain
environmental conditions of humidity, temperature, or wind to take hold or spread.
Other plant diseases may take a longer time than an animal disease to become
established or achieve destruction on the scale that a terrorist may desire.
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44  For descriptions of the diseases listed in Table 3, see the United States Animal Health
Association’s “Gray Book” [http://www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/gray_book/FAD/index.htm] and
the OIE’s “Technical Disease Cards” [http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/en_mal.htm].
Overlap diseases and agents are described by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) at [http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp].
45  OIE, Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 12th edition, May 2003
[http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/MCode/A_summry.htm].
46  Bernard Vallat, “The OIE paves the way for a new animal disease notification system,”
Editorials from the (OIE) Director General, April 2004.
Animal Pathogens
The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (Subtitle B of P.L. 107-
188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act)
created the current, official list of potential animal pathogens.  The list is specified
in the select agent rules implemented by USDA-APHIS and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).  The Act requires that these lists (Table 3) be reviewed at least every 2 years.
The select agent list for animal pathogens draws heavily from the enduring and
highly respected OIE lists of high-concern pathogens, Lists A and B.  Furthermore,
the select agent list is comprised of an APHIS-only list (of concern to animals) and
an overlap list of agents selected both by APHIS and CDC (of concern to both
animals and humans).44
OIE Lists A and B.  Prior to the  Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act, the
commonly accepted animal diseases of concern were all of the OIE’s “List A”
diseases and some of the “List B” diseases.  These diseases comprise a subset of the
select agent list (Table 3) as described below.
The OIE’s List A diseases are transmissible animal diseases that have the
potential for very serious and rapid spread, irrespective of national borders.  List A
diseases have serious socioeconomic or public health consequences and are of major
importance in the international trade.  List B diseases are transmissible diseases
considered to be of socioeconomic or public health importance within countries and
significant in international trade.45
In January 2005, the OIE plans to replace the current Lists A and B with a single
list that is more compatible with the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) of
the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The new OIE list will classify all listed
diseases equally, giving each the same degree of importance in international trade.
In creating the list, OIE is reviewing its criteria for including a disease, and the
disease or epidemiological events that require member countries to file reports.46
Select Agents List.  The regulations establishing the select agent list for
animals (9 CFR 121.3) set forth the requirements for possession, use and transfer of
these biological agents or toxins to ensure safe handling and for security to protect
them from use in domestic or international terrorism.  APHIS determined that the
biological agents and toxins on the list have the potential to pose a severe threat to
agricultural production or food products.
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47  The 15 OIE List A diseases in 9 CFR 121.3(d) include African horse sickness, African
swine fever, bluetongue, classical swine fever, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia,
foot-and-mouth disease, highly pathogenic avian influenza, lumpy skin disease, Newcastle
disease, peste des petits ruminants, rinderpest, sheep pox, goat pox, swine vesicular disease,
and vesicular stomatitis.
48  The five OIE List B diseases in 9 CFR 121.3(d) include bovine spongiform
encephalopathy, heartwater, Japanese encephalitis, malignant catarrhal fever, and contagious
caprine pleuropneumonia.
49  The three other disease agents in 9 CFR 121.3(d) include Akabane virus, Camel pox
virus, and Menangle virus.
Table 3.  Livestock Diseases in the Select Agent List
Animal diseases caused by
agents/toxins listed by APHIS in
9 CFR 121.3(d)
Overlap diseases and agents/toxins
listed by both APHIS and CDC in
9 CFR 121.3(b)
African horse sickness Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
African swine fever Botulinum neurotoxins
Akabane Botulinum neurotoxin-producing species
of ClostridiumAvian influenza (highly pathogenic)
Bluetongue (exotic) Brucellosis of cattle (Brucella abortus)
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Brucellosis of sheep (Brucella melitensis)
Camel pox Brucellosis of pigs (Brucella suis)
Classical swine fever Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia Botulism (Clostridium botulinum)
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin
Goat pox (Valley fever) Coccidioides immitis
Heartwater (Cowdria ruminantium) Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)
Japanese encephalitis Eastern equine encephalitis 
Lumpy skin disease Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
Malignant catarrhal fever Hendra virus (of horses)
Menangle virus Nipah virus (of pigs)
Newcastle disease (exotic) Rift Valley fever
Peste des petits ruminants Shigatoxin
Rinderpest Staphylococcal enterotoxins
Sheep pox T-2 toxin
Swine vesicular disease Venezuelan equine encephalitis 
Vesicular stomatitis 
Source: 9 CFR 121.3(b) and (d), supplemented with common disease names as appropriate.
The 23 animal diseases listed exclusively by APHIS in 9 CFR 121.3(d) – the left
column of Table 3 – include 15 of the 16 OIE “List A” diseases47 and 5 of the “List
B” diseases.48  Three other diseases49 were included because of their potential or
emerging animal health risks.  Thus, the select agent list is more comprehensive than
the OIE’s high consequence list, adjusted for the additional risks posed by terrorism.
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50  Nine OIE List B diseases in the overlap list (9 CFR 121.3(b)) include anthrax, brucellosis
of cattle, brucellosis of sheep, brucellosis of swine, glanders, Q fever, Eastern equine
encephalitis, tularemia, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis.
51  Pending publication of the hearing transcript, video archive is available at
[http://govt-aff.senate.gov/audio_video/111903video.rm], at minutes 34:20-36:00.
The 21 diseases and overlap agents/toxins included by both APHIS and CDC
in 9 CFR 121.3(b) – the right column of Table 3 – pose a risk to both human and
animal health.  In June 2002, CDC convened an interagency working group to review
the list of select agents and develop recommendations regarding possible changes.
The one OIE List A disease that was not included in the APHIS-only list, Rift Valley
fever, is an overlap agent.  The overlap list also includes nine OIE List B diseases.50
It is important to note that the select agent list designates and regulates
pathogens, not diseases.  Thus, the overlap list between APHIS and CDC is
somewhat more comprehensive than a disease-only list, particularly because certain
pathogens may not cause a disease, per se, but may cause symptoms such as food
poisoning or central nervous systems responses.
Some of the pathogens in the select agent list receive more attention than others
in discussions about agroterrorism.  One reason is that the select agent list was
designed to regulate access to and handling of high-consequence pathogens, not the
diseases directly.
For example, the causative agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE,
or “mad cow disease”) is considered dangerous enough to be a select agent, even
though mad cow disease is less likely to be a terrorist’s choice than other diseases.
With BSE, infection is not certain, symptoms take years to manifest, and the disease
may not be detected – all making credit for an attack more doubtful.
On the other hand, foot and mouth disease (FMD) is probably the most
frequently mentioned disease when agroterrorism is discussed, due to its ease of use,
ability to spread rapidly, and potential for great economic damage.  In testimony
before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on November 19, 2003, Dr.
Thomas McGinn of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture described a
simulation of an FMD attack by a terrorist at a single location.  Only after the 5th day
of the attack would the disease be detected, by which time it may have spread to 23
states.  By the 8th day, 23 million animals may need to be destroyed in 29 states.51
Widespread animal diseases like brucellosis, influenza, or tuberculosis receive
relatively less attention than FMD, hog cholera, or Newcastle disease.  However,
emerging diseases such as Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and the H5N1 strain of avian
influenza (zoonotic diseases that have infected people, mostly in Asia) can be lethal
since vaccines are elusive or have not been developed.
Plant Pathogens
The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (Subtitle B of P.L. 107-
188) also instructed APHIS and CDC to create the current official list of potential
plant pathogens.  The Federal government lists biological agents and toxins for plants
in 7 CFR 331.3 (Table 4).  The Act requires that these lists be reviewed at least every
2 years, and revised as necessary.
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Table 4.  Plant Diseases in the Select Agent List
Plant diseases caused by... the select agents listed in 7 CFR 331.3
Citrus greening Liberobacter africanus, L. asiaticus
Philippine downy mildew (of corn) Peronosclerospora philippinensis
Soybean rust Phakopsora pachyrhizi
Plum pox (of stone fruits) Plum pox potyvirus
Bacterial wilt, brown rot (of potato) Ralstonia solanacearum, race 3, biovar 2
Brown stripe downy mildew (of corn) Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae
Potato wart or potato canker Synchytrium endobioticum
Bacterial leaf streak (of rice) Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzicola
Citrus variegated chlorosis Xylella fastidiosa
Source: 7 CFR 331.3(a), supplemented with common disease names as appropriate.
Prior to the Act, there was not a commonly recognized list of the most
dangerous plant pathogens, although several diseases were usually mentioned and are
now included in the APHIS select agent list.
The list of 9 biological agents and toxins in 7 CFR 331.3 was compiled by the
Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) program in APHIS, in consultation with
USDA’s Agricultural Research Service; Forest Service; Cooperative State Research,
Education, and Extension Service; and the American Phytopathological Society.  The
listed agents and toxins are viruses, bacteria, or fungi that can pose a severe threat to
a number of important crops, including potatoes, rice, soybeans, corn, citrus, and
stone fruit.  Because the pathogens can cause widespread crop losses and economic
damage, they could potentially be used by terrorists.
Other plant pathogens not included in the select agent list possibly could be used
against certain crops or geographic regions.  Examples include Karnal bunt and citrus
canker, which both currently exist in the U.S. in regions quarantined or under
surveillance by USDA.  As with other agents, the effectiveness of such an attack to
spread such a disease may be dependent on environmental conditions and difficult
to achieve.
Countering the Threat
The goal of the U.S. animal and plant health safeguarding system is to prevent
the introduction and establishment of exotic pests and diseases, to mitigate their
effects when present, and to eradicate them when feasible.  In the past, introductions
of pests and pathogens were presumed to be unintentional and occurred through
natural migration across borders or accidental movement by international commerce
(passengers, conveyance, or cargo).  However, a system designed for accidental or
natural outbreaks is not sufficient for defending against intentional attack.
Consequently, the U.S. system is being upgraded to address the reality of
agroterrorism.
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52  National Research Council (2003), p. 41-59.
53  For more discussion of current border inspections practices and data on past agricultural
and other inspections programs, please see CRS Report RL32399, Border Security:
Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues, by Ruth Wasem, et al.
The National Research Council outlines a three-pronged strategy for countering
the threat of agroterrorism:52
! Deterrence and prevention
! Detection and response
! Recovery and management
Even though no foreign terrorist attacks on crops or livestock have occurred in
the United States, government agencies and private businesses have not taken the
threat lightly.  Because of the importance of brand names in marketing, many
agribusinesses have prepared response plans or added security measures to protect
their product line, looking at threats ranging from the source of their inputs to their
retail distribution network.  Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, biosecurity is an
increasing priority among food manufacturers, merchandisers, retailers, and
commercial farmers nationwide.
Deterrence and Prevention
Primary prevention and deterrence interventions for foreign pests and diseases
include international treaties and standards (such as the International Plant Protection
Convention, and those of the OIE/World Organization for Animal Health), bilateral
and multilateral cooperative efforts, off-shore activities in host countries, port-of-
entry inspections, quarantine, treatment, and post-import tracking of plants, animals
and their products.
Every link in the agricultural production chain is susceptible to attack with a
biological weapon.  Traditionally the first defense against a foreign animal or plant
disease has been to try to keep it out of the country.  Agricultural inspectors at pre-
clearance inspections and at the U.S. borders are the first line of defense.53
Smuggling  interdiction efforts can act as deterrents before biological agents reach
their target.
DHS and USDA already conduct such inspection and quarantine practices, but
continued oversight is necessary to determine which preparedness activities and
threats need more attention.  Off-shore activities include pre-clearance inspection by
APHIS of U.S. imports before products leave their port of origin.  APHIS has
personnel in at least 27 host countries.  Although many of these inspections programs
were built to target unintentional threats, they are being augmented with personnel
and technology to look for intentional threats.
Various U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies collect information
about biological weapons that could be used against U.S. agriculture.  Building and
maintaining a climate of information sharing between USDA, DHS, and the
intelligence community is necessary, especially so that agriculture is not overlooked
compared to other infrastructure and human targets.
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Once inside the U.S., many parts of the food production chain may be
susceptible to attack with a biological weapon.  For example, terrorists may have
unmonitored access to geographically remote crop fields and livestock feedlots.
Diseases may infect herds more rapidly in modern concentrated confinement
livestock operations than in open pastures.  An undetected disease may spread rapidly
because livestock are transported more frequently and over greater distances between
farms, and to processing plants.  Processing plants and shipping containers need to
be secured and/or tracked to prevent tampering.
An important line of defense is biosecurity, or the use of preventive security
measures.  On the farm, biosecurity is the use of farm management practices that both
protect animals and crops from the introduction of infectious agents and contain a
disease to prevent its rapid spread within a herd or to other farms. Biosecurity
practices include structural enclosures to limit outside exposure to people and wild
animals, and the cleaning and disinfection of people, clothing, vehicles, equipment,
and supplies entering the farm. 
Most farm specialists agree that livestock farmers are increasingly aware of the
importance of biosecurity measures, particularly since the FMD outbreaks in
European cattle and the avian flu and exotic Newcastle infections in U.S. poultry.
More farm operators are requiring visitors to wear boot covers to guard against
bringing in disease.  Regardless of the reason for following biosecurity measures
(terrorism or accidents),  these precautions help prepare farms against agroterrorism.
Detection and Response
In the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-199), the conference
committee made the following observation about agroterrorism preparedness:
The conferees agree that emergency preparedness related to field crops, farm
animals and food processing and distribution is of critical importance, and that
the agriculture and food sectors are part of the critical infrastructure requiring
heightened attention and protection. Given the integral roles of state and local
governments and the private sector in detecting, deterring and responding to acts
of agro-terrorism, the conferees expect the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Homeland Security to coordinate efforts in assisting states,
particularly by providing financial and technical support to initiatives oriented
toward interstate cooperation in joint preparedness initiatives. The conferees are
particularly interested in those states that have developed or are currently
developing coordinated interstate initiatives (H.Rept. 108-401, conference report
to accompany H.R. 2673, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004).
Biological attacks on crops and livestock may not be immediately apparent.
Therefore, existing frameworks for detecting, identifying, reporting, tracking, and
managing natural and accidental disease outbreaks are being applied to combating
agroterrorism. Appropriate responses are being developed based on specific
pathogens, targets, and other circumstances that may surround an attack.
DHS and USDA have responded with a more detailed and coordinated plan to
secure the food supply, particularly with the announcement of HSPD-9.  The
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54  DHS Fact Sheet.  “Strengthening the Security of Our Nation’s Food Supply,” July 6,
2004 [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0453.xml].
55  Food Marketing Institute, “Food and Agriculture ISAC (Information Sharing and
Analysis Center)”, [http://www.fmi.org/isac/].
56  Food Chemical News, “Food industry creates new Homeland Security liaison groups,”
July 12, 2004.
57  USDA-APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (2002). Emergency Programs Manual,
available at [http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/manuals/pdf_files/EPM.pdf].
58  A summary of the emergency response plan for animals is available from USDA-APHIS
at [http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet_faq_notice/fs_ahfmdres.html]
departments are cooperating on research funding, detection technology, surveillance,
partnerships with private industry, and state and local response coordination.54
Within private industry, the Food and Agriculture Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) shares information with government intelligence bureaus
through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The Food and Agriculture
ISAC includes over 40 of the primary trade associations representing food and
agriculture.  ISAC’s exist in several industries and are one of the primary
partnerships between government and industry for counter-terrorism cooperation.  By
combining information among members in the same industry, security problems or
attacks may become apparent more quickly than observations within individual
companies.  In the event of a terrorist incident, the ISAC would facilitate
communication within the industry and coordinate response efforts with government
officials.  The Food and Agriculture ISAC was created in February 2002 and is
administered by the Food Marketing Institute.  In 2003, three sub-ISAC’s were
created to cover more specific threats and information sharing for (1) agriculture, (2)
food manufacturing and processing, and (3) retail.55
In addition to the ISAC, DHS recently created the Food and Agriculture Sector
Coordinating Council, which will oversee food security and incident management.
The Council includes seven sub-councils: plant producers, animal producers,
manufacturers/processors, restaurants/food service, retail, warehousing, and
agricultural production inputs.56
The exact methods for control and eradication operations are difficult to predict.
Past experience and simulations have shown that day-to-day decisions would be
made using “decision trees” that include factors such as the geographical spread,
rates of infestation, available personnel, public sentiment, and industry cooperation.
Response procedures are outlined in the APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine
(PPQ) Emergency Programs Manual57 and the APHIS Veterinary Services (VS)
Federal Emergency Response Plan for an Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease or
Other Highly Contagious Diseases.58
In an outbreak, damage is proportional to the time it takes to first detect the
disease.  If a foreign disease is introduced, responsibility for recognizing initial
symptoms rests with farmers, producers, veterinarians, plant pathologists and
entomologists. Cooperative Extension Service agents at state universities are
receiving additional training on recognizing the likely symptoms of an agroterrorism
attack.
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59  For more information on avian flu and the U.S. response, see CRS Report RS21747,
Avian Influenza: Multiple Strains Cause Different Effects Worldwide, by Jim Monke.
Effective detection depends on a heightened sense of awareness, and on the
ability to rapidly determine the level of threat (e.g., developing and deploying rapid
disease diagnostic tools).  Lessons from disease outbreaks, including the recent FMD
outbreaks in Europe and avian flu in Asia and the United States, show that the speed
of detection, diagnosis, and control spell the difference between an isolated incident
and an economic and public health disaster.59
However, in recent years, the number of veterinarians with experience to
recognize many foreign animal diseases has declined.  This is because the United
States has been successful in eradicating many animal diseases.  Also, the number of
veterinarians available across the country with large animal experience and within
APHIS has declined.  In light of this trend, APHIS has initiated efforts to increase
training for foreign animal diseases and create registries of veterinarians with
appropriate experience.
Most of the initial response to the diagnosis of a foreign animal disease is at the
state and local level.  If an outbreak spreads across state lines or if state and local
efforts are unable to control the outbreak, federal involvement quickly follows.
Numerous simulation exercises have been conducted by both federal, state and local
authorities to test the response and coordination efforts of a agroterrorism attack.
Examples of such simulations include the Silent Prairie exercise in Washington
(February 11, 2003),  the Silent Farmland exercise in North Carolina (August 5,
2003), Exercise High Stakes in Kansas (June 18, 2003).
The last line of defense, and the costliest, is the isolation, control, and
eradication of an epidemic.  The more geographically widespread a disease outbreak,
the costlier and more drastic the control measures become.  Officials gained valuable
experience from recent agricultural disease outbreaks such as avian influenza in the
U.S., Canada, and Asia; FMD in the UK; and citrus canker in Florida.  Each one of
these epidemics has required the depopulation and destruction of livestock and crops
in quarantine areas, indemnity payments to farmers, and immediate suspension of
trade.
Of all lines of defense, mass eradication is the most politically sensitive and
difficult.  Actions taken in each of these outbreaks have met with varying degrees of
resistance from groups opposed to mass slaughter of animals, citizens concerned
about environmental impacts of destroying carcases, or from farmers who fear the
loss of their livelihood. During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom,
the public was clearly opposed to the large piles of burning carcasses.  The disposal
of millions of chicken carcasses in British Columbia, Canada, during 2004 also
caused a significant public debate.  Thus, scientific alternatives are needed for mass
slaughter and carcass disposal.  Citrus canker eradication efforts in Florida’s
residential neighborhoods illustrate how science-based measures have been
challenged and delayed in the courts, or how farmers may be reluctant to voluntarily
test crops or livestock. 
Laboratories and Research.  Since September 11, 2001, the United States
has expanded its agricultural laboratory and diagnostic infrastructure, and created
networks to share information and process samples. So far, 19 universities and
institutions have been tapped for the USDA-funded National Plant Diagnostic
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Network (NPDN) and its sister group, the National Animal Health Laboratory
Network (NAHLN). A main goal of each is to improve the diagnostic and detection
system in the event of a deliberate or accidental disease outbreak.
The effectiveness of these networks will require coordinated outreach, observers
say, and cooperative extension services will take on new prominence in their role of
providing information about diseases like soybean rust to farmers and others who
have regular contact with farms.
Within USDA, several agencies have upgraded their facilities to respond better
to the threat of agroterrorism by expanding laboratory capacity and adding physical
security.  These programs include the ARS research on foreign animal diseases at the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York (the physical facility is now
managed and operated by DHS) and the ARS Southeast Poultry Research Lab in
Athens, Georgia.
Also at USDA, three major laboratories are consolidating operations in a new
facility in Ames, Iowa.  These include the ARS National Animal Disease Center
(NADC), the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), and the
APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB).  The complex will be USDA's largest
animal health center for research, diagnosis and product evaluation.  The NVSL is
especially visible because it makes the final determination of most animal diseases
when samples are submitted for testing.
USDA also cooperates with other federal agencies on counter-terrorism research
and preparedness, including the ARS and APHIS partnership with the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at Ft. Dietrick, Maryland.  The Ft.
Dietrick site offers USDA access to additional high-level biosecurity laboratories.
In the recent past, USDA has conducted research on soybean rust at Ft. Dietrick.
In April 2004, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate announced the
department’s first university research grants for agriculture as part of its “centers for
excellence” program.60  The University of Minnesota and Texas A&M will share $33
million over three years.  Texas A&M’s new Center for Foreign Animal and
Zoonotic Disease Research will study high consequence animal diseases.  The
University of Minnesota’s new Center for Post-Harvest Food Protection and Defense
will establish best practices for the management of and response to food
contamination events.  Texas A&M is partnering with four universities and will
receive $18 million; Minnesota is partnering with ten universities and will receive
$15 million.
The House Appropriations Committee addressed agroterrorism research in
report language for the FY2004 appropriations bill.  The “centers for excellence”
program appears to fit the type of research the committee suggested.
Agro-terrorism research. The Committee is familiar with potential
agro/bioterrorism vulnerabilities, from animal and plant diseases to food chain
introductions. While some agro-terrorism research is already being done by the
Department of Agriculture, the Committee is aware of the need for more such
research, particularly in the areas of threats to field crops, farm animals, and food
in the processing and distribution chain. The Homeland Security Act of 2002
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provides for coordination of research between the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and other relevant federal agencies in various areas of research.
Because the Department of Agriculture (USDA) already possesses mechanisms,
authorities, and personnel to carry out needed agro/bioterrorism research, the
Committee expects to see effective coordination between the USDA and the
DHS to move such research forward in an effective and expeditious fashion. The
Committee expects USDA to coordinate with DHS to identify research gaps and
develop a plan, to include research priorities, for proceeding to fill such gaps.
Further, the Committee expects that non-government entities selected to carry out
research will be ones with proven expertise in agriculture research, and strong
familiarity with USDA animal and plant diagnostic laboratories and practices
(H.Rept. 108-193, to accompany H.R. 2673).
Federal Authorities.  When a foreign animal disease is discovered, whether
accidentally or intentionally introduced,  the Secretary of Agriculture has broad
authority to eradicate it or prevent it from entering the country.61  The use of these
authorities is fairly common, as shown recently by the import restrictions imposed
during the 2004 outbreak of avian influenza in Asia.  Federal quarantines and
restrictions on interstate movement within the U.S. are also common for certain pest
and disease outbreaks, such as for sudden oak death in California and citrus canker
in Florida.  In addition to federal authorities, most states have similar authorities, at
least for quarantine and import restrictions.
For example, if an animal disease outbreak is found in the United States, the
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized, among other things, to:
! Stop imports of animals and animal products into the U.S. from
suspected countries (7 U.S.C. 8303)
! Stop animal exports (7 U.S.C. 8304) and interstate transport of
diseased or suspected animals (7 U.S.C. 8305); 
! Seize, quarantine, and dispose of infected livestock to prevent
dissemination of the disease (7 U.S.C. 8306); 
! Compensate owners for the fair market value of animals destroyed
by the Secretary’s orders (7 U.S.C. 8306(d)); and 
! Transfer the necessary funding from USDA’s Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) to cover costs of eradication, quarantine, and
compensation programs (7 U.S.C. 8316).62
Similar authorities cover plant pests and diseases (7 U.S.C. 7701-7772).
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Recovery and Management
Several activities such as confinement and eradication start in the response
phase but continue throughout the management and recovery phase.  Long-term
economic recovery includes resuming the husbandry of animals and plants in the
affected areas, introducing new genetic traits that may be necessary in response to the
pest or disease, rebuilding confidence in domestic markets, and regaining
international market share.
Confidence in food markets, by both domestic and international customers,
depends on continuing surveillance after the threat is controlled or eradicated.
Communication and education programs would need to inform growers directly
affected by the outbreak, and inform consumers abot the source and safety of their
food.  The social sciences and public health institutions play a complementary role
to the agricultural sciences in responding to and recovering from agroterrorism.
 
If eradication of the pest or disease is not possible, an endemic infestation would
result in a lower equilibrium level of production or quality.  Resources would be
devoted to acquiring plant varieties with resistance characteristics and breeds of
animals more suitable to the new environment.  This is the goal of the National Plant
Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) mentioned in HSPD-9 and being initiated by
APHIS.
Issues for Congress
Federal Appropriations for FY2005
In the President’s budget request for FY2005, the Administration calls for
significantly increased spending on several agroterrorism preparedness programs.
Overall, USDA is requesting an FY2005 appropriation of $511 million for homeland
security activities (up 166% from the $192 million appropriated in FY2004; see
Table 1).  Some of these increases are one-time only expenses (such as construction
of the Ames, Iowa, laboratory), while others may represent new and continuing
programs.  Both types are described below.
Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative.  Within the overall request,
USDA has highlighted several programs in its newly termed “Food and Agriculture
Defense Initiative” (hereafter, the “initiative”).  It appears that the preparedness plans
outlined in HSPD-9 are coordinated with the initiative, and HSPD-9 could be used
to support the request for the initiative in the appropriations process.
The initiative includes $381 million (or 75%) of the overall $511 million USDA
request for FY2005 homeland security-related activities.  Thus, it does not include
certain ongoing programs such as border security.  The programs that USDA selected
for the initiative were funded at $79 million in FY2004, and $204 million in FY2003
(Table 5).
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Food Defense: 11 15 53
Food Emergency Response Network FSIS 0 0 14
Surveillance and monitoring FSIS 1 1 6
FSIS enhanced inspections FSIS 0 2 2
Lab upgrades, physical security FSIS 1 3 6
Education, training, other FSIS 6 6 8
Research ARS 2 2 16
Agriculture Defense: 193 65 328
Ames , Iowa BSL-3 facility ARS 143 0 178
Research ARS 10 12 15
National Plant Disease Recovery ARS 0 0 6
Regional Diagnostic Network CSREES 0 8 30
Higher educ. agrosecurity program CSREES 0 0 5
Plant and animal health monitoring APHIS 4 4 50
National Veterinary Vaccine Bank APHIS 0 0 7
Other APHIS 37 40 38
Total, Food and Agriculture
Defense Initiative USDA 204 79 381
Source: USDA Budget Summary, FY2005.
The largest item in the initiative is the final appropriation for ARS to complete
construction of the Ames, IA, BSL-3 animal research and diagnostic laboratory.  The
FY2005 request for this laboratory is $178 million, 47% of the Food and Agriculture
Defense Initiative, and 35% of the overall USDA homeland security request.
Many of the initiative’s programs would improve the Federal government’s
ability to more quickly identify and characterize an agroterrorist attack through
surveillance and monitoring (FY2005 request: $6 million for FSIS, $39 million for
APHIS).  In its justification for the initiative, USDA says these activities will
promote data sharing and joint analysis among federal, state and local levels, and will
establish a federal multi-agency intelligence capability integrated through DHS.
An example of such coordination is the new Food Emergency Response
Network (FERN) of laboratories (a new appropriation request of $14 million for
FSIS in FY2005 and $23 million for the Food and Drug Administration, FDA).
These computer networks allow labs to improve information sharing, rapid
identification, and consistent diagnostic methods for contaminated foods.
Another preparedness effort in the initiative is the National Veterinary Vaccine
Bank and the National Plant Disease Recovery System (both of which are mentioned
in HSPD-9).  These two programs had no budget line in FY2004, but total $13
million in new spending in the FY2005 request.
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63  In the past, animal disease outbreaks have been managed by quickly destroying affected
herds.  However, smaller Federal and state work forces, environmental restrictions, animal
welfare concerns, and trade rules may affect feasibility of large-scale culling.  For certain
species and diseases, vaccines could become as beneficial for controlling the disease, and
might be more economical (Explanatory Notes for the FY2005 APHIS budget request).
The plant recovery system is a joint effort with the seed industry to develop
resistant seed varieties and, in the event of catastrophic disease or pest outbreak, to
provide them to producers before the next planting season (a new appropriation
request of $6 million in FY2005).  The vaccine bank would improve preparedness
for bioterrorism against livestock and complement the North American FMD
Vaccine Bank.  APHIS has a long term plan to stockpile enough vaccine to
adequately treat five foreign animal diseases.63  For FY2005, APHIS requested $6
million of no-year money to be available when viable vaccine choices become
available.  In the short term, APHIS hopes to obtain enough vaccine for one of these
diseases in FY2005.
House Action.  The House passed the FY2005 agriculture appropriations bill
(H.R. 4766) on July 13, 2004.  The committee report (H.Rept. 108-584) mentions
several agroterrorism-related items.
For ARS, the House bill fully funds the request for laboratory construction in
Ames, IA.  For APHIS, the House would fund new bio-surveillance programs at $2
million rather than $5 million, vaccine banks at $3 million rather than $6 million, and
trim the increase for emergency coordinators from $4.6 million to $2.6 million.  The
House bill funds the $1.9 million request for the National Animal Health Laboratory
Network, and the $2.5 million request for the APHIS select agent program.  The
House bill does not fund the APHIS request for $0.9 million for biosecurity or the
$2.4 million request for APHIS personnel at Plum Island.  The House bill does not
fund the $7.1 million APHIS request for physical security enhancements.
For FSIS, the House bill funds $6.6 million for the Food Emergency Response
Network (FERN) rather than the $14 million requested.  FDA would receive its full
request of $23 million for FERN.  The FSIS request for $6 million for surveillance
is trimmed to $3.5 million, and the $10 million request for laboratory upgrades and
training is reduced to $5.5 million in the House bill.
Preparedness
Two complementary bills addressing agroterrorism preparedness have been
introduced in the 108th Congress: S. 427 (the Agriculture Security Assistance Act)
and S. 430 (the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act).   S. 427 provides funding for
state and local preparedness, and creates awareness programs and grants for farmers.
S. 430 seeks to improve coordination between USDA and other federal agencies.
Both bills were introduced on February 24, 2003 and address different aspects
of agroterrorism preparedness by amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-296).  
The bills, both referred to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, are sponsored by Senator Akaka and cosponsored by Senators Lautenberg,
Durbin, and Clinton.  Senators Akaka, Lautenberg, and Durbin are members of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, the committee that held hearings on
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agroterrorism on November 19, 2003.  The Committee on Agriculture has not acted
on the bills since they were referred.
If enacted, these bills would provide more concrete Congressional instructions
and budget authorizations for agroterrorism preparedness.  However, similar results
may occur if the presidential directive HSPD-9 is implemented successfully.  The
presidential directives facilitating agroterrorism preparedness did not exist when the
bills were introduced.
While Congress certainly has oversight authority of federal agencies and may
ask questions about implementation of HSPD-9, a public law outlining and directing
the implementation of an agroterrorism preparedness plan would establish the
statutory parameters for such a plan, and, as a practical matter, might result in
enhanced oversight by specifically identifying executive branch entities responsible
for carrying out particular components of such a plan.
S. 427. The Agriculture Security Assistance Act (S. 427) would provide
funding for state and local vulnerability assessments, plans, and expanded
information systems.  The bill would authorize such sums as necessary for emergency
response plans, $2.5 million for geographic information systems, and $5 million for
grants to state and local animal health officials.
The bill would also create awareness programs and grants for farm-level
producers to improve biosecurity measures.  It would authorize $5 million for the
development and dissemination of on-farm biosecurity guidelines, and $5 million for
on-farm biosecurity improvement grants (up to $10,000 per farm, and thus reaching
at least 500 farms).  These first-year authorizations are followed by such sums as
necessary for succeeding years.  Actual funding would be determined by
appropriations.
S. 430.  The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act (S. 430) seeks to improve
coordination between USDA and other federal agencies.  These agencies include the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and intelligence agencies for tracking
targets and incidents, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for
disaster plans, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for animal care,
and the Department of State for foreign agricultural disease notification and
cooperation.  The bill would provide for a USDA review of laboratory capacity, and
a Department of Justice review of legal authorities for response plans.
The bill would create “liaison” positions in DHS, specifically within the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and HHS.  USDA already has a liaison
staff in the Office of the Secretary, namely the Homeland Security Staff.  While not
the same as proposed in S. 430, this existing USDA liaison appears to be undertaking
a role similar to that proposed by the bill.
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Appendix A: USDA Homeland Security Funding, by Program
Appendix A:
Homeland Security Mission Area
    USDA Agency and Program
Budget authority ($ million)
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005Request
Border and transportation security 143.2 163.1 169.3
    FSIS: Enhanced inspections 2.0 2.0
    APHIS: Ag Quarantine Inspection, approp. 24.2 25.4 21.6
    APHIS: Ag Quarantine Inspection, user fees 119.0 133.0 140.0
    APHIS: Import/Export 2.7 5.7
Defending against catastrophic threats 154.6 20.7 227.0
    ARS: Ames, IA, BSL-3 facility 142.8 0.0 178.0
    ARS: Research 11.8 20.7 43.0
    ARS: National Plant Recovery System 6.0
Protecting critical infrastructure, key assets 60.5 86.3 166.0
    CSREES: Regional Diagnostic Network 7.9 30.0
    Dept. Admin.: Physical security 8.0 7.9 13.6
    APHIS: Physical security 7.1
    ARS: Physical security 0.6 10.5
    FSIS: Physical security 0.2 0.3 0.2
    FSIS: Expanded laboratory capabilities 1.0 3.1 3.1
    FSIS: Laboratories for chemical, radiological 2.5
    Dept. Admin.: Vulnerability assessments 0.1 0.1 0.1
    APHIS: Animal health regulatory enforcement 1.0 1.0
    APHIS: Select agents - plants 1.5
    APHIS: Cooperative ag pest survey agreements 6.1
    APHIS: National wildlife surveillance 5.0
    APHIS: International information gathering 2.5
    APHIS: National animal identification system 4.0
    APHIS: Animal health monitoring 2.1
    APHIS: Pest detection technology 2.0
    APHIS: Foreign animal disease laboratory 2.4
    APHIS: National germplasm laboratory 3.0
    APHIS: National animal health lab network 1.7
    APHIS: Emergency coordination - plants 1.5
    APHIS: Emergency coordination - animals 2.5
    APHIS: Center for veterinary biologics 0.7
    APHIS: Plant safeguarding activities 14.3 13.0 12.1
    APHIS: State cooperative agreements 4.1 4.1 10.1
    APHIS: Classical swine fever activities 1.0 1.7 1.0
    APHIS: BSE activities 8.4 8.3 8.4
    APHIS: Foot and Mouth Disease activities 9.1 9.0 9.0
    APHIS: Swine feeding surveillance 4.0 4.0 4.0
    APHIS: Nat’l veterinary lab - anthrax costs 0.9 0.5
    APHIS: Biosurveillance 5.0
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Appendix A:
Homeland Security Mission Area
    USDA Agency and Program
Budget authority ($ million)
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005Request
    APHIS: Enhanced biosecurity 2.0 2.9
    APHIS: Continuity of operations 0.2 0.2
    APHIS: Security clearances 0.6 0.6
    APHIS: Alkaline digester expenses 0.9 0.8
    APHIS: Wildlife services security 1.0 1.0
    APHIS: Veterinary lab network 4.1 3.1
    APHIS: Overseas pest risk intelligence, animal 0.7 0.7 3.0
    APHIS: Overseas pest risk intelligence, plant 2.3
    APHIS: Overseas surveillance, foot and mouth 0.7 0.7 0.7
    OCIO: Cyber infrastructure protection 7.4 4.4 9.5
Emergency preparedness and response 50.8 54.4 68.7
    ERS: GIS area analysis 1.0 1.0
    HSS: Homeland Security Staff support 0.5 1.5
    Dept. Admin.: Crisis management and planning 0.5 0.5 0.4
    Dept. Admin.: Background investigations 0.5 0.5 0.5
    FSIS: Office of Emergency Preparedness 2.2 2.2 2.2
    FSIS: Education and training 2.3 2.5 4.5
    FSIS: Technical assistance to state/local 2.2 2.2 2.2
    OCIO: Training and exercises 0.1 0.1 0.1
    OCIO: Planning 0.5 0.7 0.7
    OCIO: Alternate interoperable communication 0.5 3.6 1.6
    OCIO: Alternate facilities 0.5 0.8 0.6
    CSREES: Education and training 31.6 30.8 35.8
    APHIS: Emergency preparedness for states 1.0 1.0 1.0
    APHIS: National Veterinary Vaccine Bank 0.3 6.6
    APHIS: Other emergency management activity 8.9 7.7 10.0
Intelligence and warning 0.8 0.8 20.0
    FSIS: Surveillance and monitoring 0.8 0.8 5.7
    FSIS: Food Emergency Response Net (FERN) 10.0
    FSIS: Electronic Lab Network (eLEXNET) 3.0
    FSIS: Electronic compilation of lab methods 1.0
    AMS: Transportation monitoring 0.3
Total 409.9 325.3 651.0
Source: Compiled by CRS from USDA Office of Budget and Policy Analysis spreadsheets,
and Budget of the United States Government for FY2005: Analytical Perspectives,
“Appendix: Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and Budget Account,”
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/ap_cd_rom/homeland.pdf].
